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7.1 The Two Faces of Inﬂation Targeting
Economists should recognize that they have a history of proposing
simple “nominal anchor” prescriptions for monetary policy that have
eventually proved not to be very useful. If economists satisfy a demand for
spurious technocratic solutions to the political and institutional patholo-
gies that generate destructive episodes of deﬂation or inﬂation, they can
do harm by diverting attention from the sources of the problem. Such
nostrums can also be harmful, usually with a delay, by failing to work and
thereby undermining the credibility of monetary policy. A cynical view
might be that inﬂation targeting has become attractive less because of ad-
vances in our discipline than because of the demand for a replacement for
the gold standard, monetarism, and exchange rate anchors.
There is some reason to hope, though, that inﬂation targeting is a “bet-
ter nostrum.” This anchor is something that people do in fact care about,
rather than an “intermediate target.” It is therefore likely to remain credi-
ble that the central bank is committed to its inﬂation target even though pe-
riods when its policies are having diﬃculties. This anchor is widely recog-
nized not to be directly and immediately under the central bank’s control.
Inﬂation targeting therefore requires that the central bank explain how its
current actions relate to its view of the future course of the economy and
that it be explicit about how precisely it can control inﬂation.
But there are in fact bounds, set by ﬁscal policy broadly conceived, on
the central bank’s control over inﬂation. It may lose control of a deﬂation.
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001; hereafter BSU) show that an
7
Limits to Inﬂation Targeting
Christopher A. Sims
Christopher A. Sims is professor of economics at Princeton University, and a research as-
sociate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.interest rate rule that satisﬁes the “Taylor principle,” because of the zero
lower bound on nominal rates, can lead inevitably to a deﬂationary spiral.1
They did not emphasize that the result depends on a decidedly peculiar-
looking ﬁscal policy. Peculiar though it is, we see historical examples of
something close to such a policy. To understand how such a policy can
arise, it may help to step outside the framework of models that treat the
central bank and the treasury as a uniﬁed entity with a single budget con-
straint.
The central bank may be faced with a ﬁscal policy that fails to make pri-
mary surpluses respond to the level of debt and thereby undoes any eﬀort
by the bank to restrict the volume of outstanding nominal liabilities. Loyo
(2000) shows how a failure of ﬁscal backing for monetary policy can leave
interest rate increases powerless to restrain inﬂation, and he applies his
model to interpreting Brazilian experience. Even when what are usually
thought of as appropriate ﬁscal policies prevail, there are generally com-
petitive equilibria in which spiraling inﬂation leads to the disappearance of
real balances. Such equilibria can be suppressed by “backup” policies that
put a ﬂoor on the value of money, via either taxation or reserve holdings.
But it is not automatic that such backup policies are credible.
As a theoretical possibility, moreover, the lack of a credible ﬁscal policy
may open the door to equilibria in which accelerating inﬂation leads to de-
monetization of the economy, even when policies are also consistent with
stable equilibria. This theoretical possibility may inﬂuence central bank
thinking, even though it has rarely if ever been observed.
7.2 Deﬂationary Traps via “Ricardian” Fiscal Policy
In this section and the next we consider two models, both highly simpli-
ﬁed, that display in stark form the nature of ﬁscal bounds on the ability to
control the price level. There is no claim here of originality. The basic idea
of the deﬂationary model is in the work of BSU, and the interest rate rule
model is a variant of one worked out in Sims (2000). And these models in
turn draw on early work on the ﬁscal theory. The point of displaying these
models here is to provide some reminders of the ways control over the price
level can fail and of how the failures depend on ﬁscal policy.
The ﬁrst model we consider is not an inﬂation-targeting model in any
sense. The BSU models it parallels consider interest rate policy rules that
have, in much of the literature, been taken to guarantee a determinate price
level. The BSU models therefore can be interpreted as showing that mak-
ing interest rates respond to inﬂation in a way that would widely be thought
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1. “Inevitably” is arguably too strong a word here. They ﬁnd indeterminacy. But in a sto-
chastic world, indeterminacy reappears at every moment, and any random perturbation of a
nicely behaved equilibrium is likely to lead to the deﬂationary trap.of as guaranteeing that inﬂation stays close to target can instead leave the
economy open to a deﬂationary spiral. The model we present here strips
away nonneutralities, and even bonds and interest rates, to show that the
type of ﬁscal policy BSU consider will produce their sort of result even
without an interest rate rule. The pathology they display is likely to be pos-
sible whenever policy in eﬀect provides a tax backing for money, as if mon-
etary liabilities were interest bearing.
The model has many identical agents, choosing time paths for their con-
sumption C and money holdings M. They receive an endowment income
of Y each period and pay lump sum taxes  . They have time-separable log-
arithmic utility functions in C. They value money because increased real
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The ﬁrst-order conditions of the representative agent are
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In continuous-time rational-expectations models like this one it is par-
ticularly important to keep track of what the model deﬁnes as being able to
“jump” and what it constrains not to jump. Often this is done by listing
variables that can jump and that cannot, but not every model is properly
characterized this way. It is quite possible for certain functions of variables
in the model to be constrained not to jump, whereas all the arguments of
the functions individually are not so constrained. In this paper we use the
convention that all equations representing constraints hold not only for all
t   0 but also in a neighborhood of t   0. First-order conditions, on the
other hand, apply only for t   0. Thus if a constraint equation contains a
Limits to Inﬂation Targeting 285single dotted variable (e.g., the M ˙ in equations [2] or [5]), the dotted vari-
able, because its derivative must exist in a neighborhood of t 0, is implied
to have time paths continuous at t   0.2 An equation that is a constraint
and contains multiple dotted variables does not constrain each individual
dotted variable to have an absolutely continuous path. In a linear equation,
it will be only the linear combination whose derivative appears in the con-
straint that is constrained to be absolutely continuous. On the other hand,
a variable like P in this model, which appears “dotted” only as the highest-
order derivative in ﬁrst-order conditions, is constrained only to have a right
derivative, with a possible discontinuity in its level at t   0.
Some algebraic manipulation allows us to derive from the ﬁrst-order
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which, because its derivation uses ﬁrst-order conditions, holds only for
positive t, so that V is allowed to be discontinuous at t   0.
If we assume Y to be constant and impose the fairly reasonable condi-
tions that  0   Y and  1    , but  1 –   small, then this equation in V has
two steady states, a smaller one that is approximately ( 1 –  )Y/ 0 and a
larger one. The smaller is stable and the larger is unstable.
In this model the deﬁnition of V and the social resource constraint
C(1   2 V )   Y together imply a monotone increasing relation between
PY/M and V for positive V. Thus we can conclude that every initial value
of Pbelow some critical value is consistent with equilibrium, each implying
a diﬀerent initial V, and all these possible initial Vs imply the same limit-
ing behavior—convergence of V to the lower steady-state value. At this









      
to ﬁrst-order accuracy in  1 –  . Thus we have the same kind of behavior
found by BSU: indeterminacy of the price level and convergence, from a
wide range of initial values, to the same equilibrium of steady deﬂation.
It is not diﬃcult to understand why this policy results in indetermi-
nacy—the policy authority has committed to back the real value of money
balances with taxes regardless of how large this real value might be. The pol-
icy therefore implies no nominal “anchor.” Prices can fall to arbitrarily low
levels, boosting real balances to arbitrarily high levels, and even though no
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2. The derivative itself does not have to be continuous at t   0. What is required is that M
be absolutely continuous with a derivative deﬁned except on a set of measure zero and with
the time path of M the integral of its time derivative.one has a transactions use for the additional real balances, the tax backing
and resulting deﬂation make holding the real balances attractive.
Above the upper steady state, the price level explodes rapidly upward
and velocity also rises rapidly. In fact, velocity converges to inﬁnity in ﬁnite
time. There is no violation of transversality or of feasibility conditions in
these explosive equilibria.
In this model, simple, apparently realistic policies will eliminate the in-
determinacy. For example, if the government replaces its “tax-backed
money” rule (4) with a commitment to hold M constant, the diﬀerential
equation in V (8) is replaced by
(10) V ˙   .
This equation has a unique, unstable steady state. Initial conditions with V
    /    imply V converging to zero, but this entails here that M/P →  .
Since agents in this equilibrium have bounded consumption paths, their
accumulation of arbitrarily large real money balances violates transversal-
ity, so these deﬂationary paths are not equilibria.
With either constant-M or Ricardian policy, the inﬂationary paths that
start with V above its steady-state value are equilibria. They can be elimi-
nated by an apparently simple policy, a commitment to back a minimal
value for money with taxation. It is well known, though, that there have in
fact been historical episodes of hyperinﬂation in which, far from using
taxes to put a ﬂoor on the value of money, ﬁscal authorities have persisted
in running primary deﬁcits as inﬂation has accelerated to extreme levels.
Furthermore, as we will discuss at more length below, some institutional
frameworks aimed at ensuring “independence” of the central bank under-
mine the credibility of any claim to provide a tax-backed ﬂoor to the value
of money.
With the Ricardian policy, real money balances grow very large on the
paths toward the lower steady state and, in the case where  1    , grow
without bound in equilibrium. The growth does not violate individual op-
timizing behavior, however, because the foreseen steady rise in taxes makes
individuals see themselves as dependent on the deﬂationary real return on
their money balances to maintain intertemporal budget balance. The usual
argument that arbitrarily high real wealth with bounded consumption vi-
olates transversality fails because the real-balance wealth is oﬀset by the
discounted present value of future taxes.
Since in this abstract model the consequences of backing money with a
Ricardian ﬁscal rule are undesirable, and since better policies are easily
available, one might ask why we need pay any attention to these results. The
Ricardian policy looks crazy because the model assumes homogeneous,
freely marketable, nominal government debt or money. This makes it easy
( V 2    )V(1   2 V)
   
1   4 V
Limits to Inﬂation Targeting 287for the government to dilute the claims of existing asset holders by new bor-
rowing, without obviously targeting a narrow and organized constituency.
It also makes it easy for asset holders, were the real current market value of
their holdings of government liabilities to grow while their future tax lia-
bilities apparently did not, to try to turn their increased wealth into current
purchases.
In Japan today, and probably also the United States in the 1930s, deﬂa-
tion has its strongest eﬀect in increasing nonmarketable, heterogeneous
government liabilities. Tomita (2002) explains the variety of ways in which
Japan’s explicit debt is less easily marketed, more concentrated in the hands
of banks and government agencies, and less homogeneous than govern-
ment debt in the United States or Europe. And it is widely understood that
both in the United States in the 1930s and in present-day Japan, the exis-
tence of large institutions with negative net worth that grows more negative
with declining prices creates implicit, nonmarketable government liabili-
ties, via potential claims to bailouts, as prices decline. When price declines
create perceptions of claims on future tax revenues via bailouts as fast as
or faster than they increase the value of marketable nominal securities in
the hands of the public, they can fail to produce any strong positive wealth
eﬀects.
Another route by which deﬂationary equilibria might arise is via central
bank balance sheet illusion.3 We have seen in the United States just a few
years ago a discussion of the consequences for the Federal Reserve balance
sheet of the vanishing of the U.S. public debt. In simple macroeconomic
models, the balance sheets of the central bank and the treasury are consol-
idated, so that the public debt has vanished when only debt held by the cen-
tral bank remains. But in the recent policy discussions it was assumed that
the Fed might need to turn to holding private securities as backing for
monetary reserves. That is, it was assumed that the treasury would con-
tinue to tax to run surpluses to retire the debt held by the Fed. This is ex-
actly the assumption of BSU’s Ricardian ﬁscal policy, although BSU re-
quire further that as deﬂation proceeds the treasury will continually
replenish the central bank balance sheet by further purchases of private as-
sets as the real value of high-powered money increases.
In the case of the U.S. Federal Reserve, it may seem unreasonable that
the treasury should see debt held by the Federal Reserve as a liability re-
quiring tax backing or that the Federal Reserve should ever perceive a need
to ask for treasury replenishment of its balance sheet. The Federal Reserve
has a nearly perfectly hedged balance sheet, with most of its assets nomi-
nal U.S. government bonds and its liabilities mostly high-powered money.
Even if it did somehow develop substantial negative net worth, why would
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3. The discussion of balance sheet illusion here and the model below of inﬂation stabiliza-
tion with reserves draws on the discussion in Sims (2000).this be a problem? Its high-powered money liabilities carry no explicit
promise that they are redeemable, so there are no creditors whose demands
could make negative net worth a problem.
But there are other structures for central bank balance sheets. The most
common direction of deviation is toward holding large amounts of reserves
in the form of securities that are not denominated in domestic currency and
hence leave the central bank less than perfectly hedged. A good example is
the European System of Central Banks, which holds most of its assets in
non-Euro securities. This clearly introduces balance sheet risk and the pos-
sibility of the bank’s arriving at a situation of negative net worth. While it
is true that there is no explicit promise to redeem high-powered money, we
shall see that for a bank that must rely on reserves rather than ﬁscal re-
sources, any attempt to commit to stabilizing the price level or inﬂation will
make net worth a concern. This fact may both limit the bank’s ability to
dampen ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and contribute to inappropriate Ricar-
dian policy behavior in a deﬂationary environment.
7.3 Stabilizing Inﬂation, with Reserves or Tax Backing
Here we return to modeling both bonds and money, so that we can dis-
cuss policy in terms of an interest rate rule, as has recently been standard
practice. We also introduce a foreign currency–denominated asset, so that
we can consider a central bank with reserves only and no access to a
backup taxing power.
In Sims (2000) I considered a model like this one, but with a central bank
that tries to control the price level. That model made the point, which is
perhaps nearly obvious, that when the central bank tries to enforce an up-
per bound on the price level, it must either limit its goals when its net worth
is negative (or might become negative) or else have access to ﬁscal backing
that would restore net worth whenever necessary. The outstanding high-
powered money, while carrying no explicit promise of redemption, ac-
quires an implicit redemption value when there is a commitment to a
bound on the price level. A central bank that relies on the value of its re-
serves to back its money issue cannot guarantee a value for the currency
stock outstanding that exceeds the value of its reserves. If it tries to do so,
it is likely to face a run. A bank that uses an interest rate rule that aims at
control of the price level does not avoid the problem. To implement its in-
terest rate rule, the bank will have to stand ready to supply bonds for high-
powered money. Disturbances to the economy—for example, to the real
interest rate—can require time paths for reserves that are not feasible with-
out replenishment of the balance sheet by ﬁscal actions. The likelihood of
this happening is greater the more seriously underwater is the central bank
balance sheet and the more tightly the bank attempts to control the price
level.
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in this model there is no tax backing of non-interest-bearing money, the
model does not have the indeterminacy and deﬂationary equilibria of the
BSU model. Nonetheless it retains the “inﬂationary demonetization” equi-
libria, which can be avoided only with tax backing or reserves.
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Here C is consumption, v   PC/M is velocity of money, F P is private hold-
ings of the real asset, B is nominal government debt, M is money (non-
interest-bearing currency), Y is an exogenous endowment stream, and   is
transfer payments from the government. The real and nominal interest
rates are, respectively,   and r.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the private agent are
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These equations can be reduced to
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As usual, the equations derived from ﬁrst-order conditions hold only for
t 0, while the constraint (12) holds continuously. The only variable forced
to be continuous at t   0 by this single private constraint is the artiﬁcial
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290 Christopher A. SimsSo instantaneous, discontinuous portfolio adjustments, swapping among
M, B, and F P,a re not ruled out. Instantaneous changes in wealth can oc-
cur, but only via jumps in P that revalue bond and money holdings. In-
stantaneous jumps in wealth via purchases or sales of assets are not pos-
sible,  because they would have to draw on savings or dissavings, and
consumption and income ﬂow at ﬁnite rates.
The consolidated government budget constraint is
(20) F ˙
G    F G   r  
B
P
    
M ˙
P
  B ˙
     ,
where F Gis government holdings of the reserve asset. Substituting equation
(20) in the private budget constraint gives us the social resource constraint
(21) C   (1    )   F ˙    F   Y,
where F   F P   F G is total holdings of the reserve asset, by both private in-
dividuals and the government.
Assuming the central bank is the only government holder of the reserve
asset and that government bonds are not held by the central bank, we get
as the central bank’s budge constraint
(22) F ˙




     B.
It is natural to assume that in normal times, when seigniorage  F B   M ˙ /P
is positive, the bank will transfer suﬃcient revenues to the treasury or the
public that its reserves remain aligned with outstanding money balances.
When seigniorage revenue becomes negative, we assume that  B is set to
zero. It may seem that it would be better policy to prevent net worth from
deteriorating by allowing  Bto go negative, but here we are trying to model
a central bank whose “independence” entails not being dependent on the
legislature for funding bailouts when net worth goes negative.
Now suppose that the monetary authority adopts an interest rate rule
that reacts to inﬂation, setting
(23) r ˙    0    1  
P
P ˙
     2r.
Note that this policy rule makes r react to inﬂation with a delay, although
the delay will be small if  2 is large. This equation does not imply that
r and P must have continuous time paths. It allows discontinuous jumps
 r in r so long as they are matched by corresponding jumps   log P/ 1 in
log P.
Using equation (17) to eliminate P ˙ /P in equation (23), we arrive at
(24) r ˙    0   ( 1    2)r    1 .
If  1    2, the unique stable solution to this equation is
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Note that despite the interest rate smoothing policy, r must move immedi-
ately in response to jumps in   that are expected to have any persistence.
This entails v jumping in response to shifts in  . Here P jumps up when  
does, but d log P/d  is less than –d log C/d . M must therefore decrease to
allow the equilibrium jump in velocity. The interest rate–setting bank must
therefore be concerned with having reserves on hand to meet sudden shifts
in real rates.
The diﬀerential equation (24) in r has unstable solutions in addition to
the stable ones. The solutions that explode downward are unsustainable.
They force r, and hence v, to zero in ﬁnite time. But this can occur only via
M/P going to inﬁnity, and in this setup, with tax backing only for bonds,
the upward explosion in M/P violates transversality: agents will try to
spend the high real balances, cutting oﬀ the deﬂation.
The solutions that make P ˙ /P explode upward have no such internal cut-
oﬀ mechanism, however. Although they imply that the economy con-
vergesto a barter equilibrium, no market mechanism along the path to this
outcome provides incentives to stop the explosion. If such paths do not oc-
cur, it has to be because of a backstop commitment, based on taxation or
reserves.
A bank backed by a ﬁscal authority that can credibly increase its pri-
mary surplus to provide resources to redeem money at some ﬁxed-ceiling
price level can cut oﬀ the explosive paths. Of course, as we have already
pointed out, ﬁscal authorities have historically continued to run primary
deﬁcits during high inﬂations, so that no such backstop commitment was
credible. (Where such a commitment were credible, the model implies that
the inﬂation would never get underway.)
A bank relying on reserves can set a ﬁxed ceiling to the price level at any
point where its reserves are adequate to redeem the entire stock of money.
But if it follows the policy rule in equation (23), there is no guarantee that
it can always be in this positive net worth position. It earns a return  on its
reserves, while the value of its liabilities M/P either remains constant or
grows at the rate of deﬂation. As long as there are no surprise jumps in the
price level (or, what is equivalent in this abstract model, the exchange rate
between reserve assets and domestic currency), the return on non-interest-
bearing money will be less than that on nominal bonds, and the bonds earn
the same real return as reserves. Therefore a bank that has reserves whose
value matches its liabilities always earns positive expected seigniorage if it
is undertaking no open-market operations.
292 Christopher A. SimsHowever, if rising inﬂation requires rapid shrinkage of nominal money
balances in order to implement the policy rule, seigniorage can turn nega-
tive. Along an unstable path, in which inﬂation accelerates and interest
rates rise, the bank will of course be undertaking contractionary open-
market operations. Whether these force it into negative seigniorage de-
pends on the nature of the demand for money. If money is “essential,” in
the sense that as velocity increases the public is willing to pay ever-
increasing opportunity costs to avoid further small decreases in real bal-
ances, then large rises in the interest rate can be accomplished with small
rates of contraction in money balances, and seigniorage may remain ro-
bustly positive. If instead demand for real balances falls rapidly when in-
terest rates reach high levels, then increasingly high rates of contraction in
M may be required for given amounts of increase in r. This can result in
large negative values of seigniorage and hence in disappearance of reserves
while nonzero money balances remain outstanding.
To illustrate these points, we consider a version of the model in which the
transactions technology has the speciﬁc form





This gives equation (18) the speciﬁc form





 )2   .
This implies that if   is positive, there is an upper bound on the nominal
interest rate, beyond which demand for real balances is totally extin-
guished. Also, with   0 there is an upper bound on the fraction of income
that can be absorbed by transactions costs. With   0 nominal interest
rates are unbounded above and transactions costs can absorb a fraction of
income arbitrarily close to 1.
We consider a scenario in which the economy begins in a steady state
with zero inﬂation, real and nominal interest rates both constant at 2 per-
cent per year. The policy rule has  0   .02,  1   1.2, and  2   1. We con-
sider an unanticipated drop in the real interest rate  to a new level, 1.8 per-
cent per year. A new stable equilibrium requires that the nominal interest
rate drop to 0.8 percent, with a corresponding drop of 1 percent in the price
level. The result will be a new equilibrium that again has a constant inter-
est rate but now has steady deﬂation at 1 percent per year, lower velocity,
higher real balances, and slightly higher consumption.
Suppose that instead the price level does not drop far enough, so that the
nominal interest rate falls only to 1 percent. Because the price level is above
the level consistent with a stable solution of the system, it sets the economy
on a path of rising nominal interest rates. Consider the case where   .02,
  .3. This implies that in noninﬂationary steady state transactions costs
Limits to Inﬂation Targeting 293consume 2 percent of income and that there is an upper bound on the nom-
inal interest rate, beyond which demand for money disappears, at 22 per-
cent. The time paths for interest rates, velocity, the log of nominal money
balances, and the log of the price level, are shown in panels A through D of
ﬁgure 7.1.
Whether or not a central bank reliant on reserves can extinguish this ex-
plosive path depends on its initial net worth position and its policy on dis-
tributing or accumulating seigniorage revenue. Assuming it accumulates
all of its seigniorage revenue results in time paths for F GP/M as shown in
ﬁgure 7.2. If its initial net worth is negative but it has assets worth 90 per-
cent of its outstanding real balances at the initial date, then accumulating
its seigniorage in the initial period allows it to achieve positive net worth,
at which point it could cut oﬀ the inﬂation by announcing it will redeem
money for the reserve asset at a ﬁxed rate of exchange. But if its initial net
worth is much below this, it never achieves positive net worth, and indeed
its reserves hit zero before the date at which real balances disappear. Obvi-
ously this makes it impossible for the bank to continue implementing its
interest rate policy rule with open-market operations. The likely outcome
294 Christopher A. Sims
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Fig. 7.1 Consequences of an insuﬃcient response of p to a   dropwould be an immediate jump to the barter equilibrium, and if this were
foreseen, the jump would occur at the initial date.
That such scenarios are possible legitimizes attention to its balance sheet
by a central bank that does not have reliable ﬁscal backing. The radical ap-
proach to central bank independence in the setup of the European Central
Bank (ECB)—cutting all explicit connections with ﬁscal authorities and
ruling out the holding of government debt as assets—has resulted in both
an unhedged balance sheet and the absence of any explicit institutional
structure for the ECB to use in case it were to need balance sheet replen-
ishment. The Bank of Japan appears to be concerned that it would lose its
recent gains in independence from the Ministry of Finance were it to arrive
at a need for balance sheet replenishment. Records of monetary policy dis-
cussions in the United States in the 1930s show that there was concern
about the “soundness” of assets being discounted by the Federal Reserve.
But in a deﬂationary environment, when the interest rate has hit its zero
lower bound, the eﬀective policy measures available to a central bank all
carry balance sheet risk. This is obviously true of purchases of illiquid
bank loans or of long-term government bonds whose current value will fall
if deﬂation ends and interest rates rise. Even the “foolproof way” of Svens-
son (2001), which prescribes massive purchases of foreign currency–
denominated bonds, because of the inherent volatility of exchange rates,
creates substantial balance sheet risk for the central bank.
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Fig. 7.2 Ratio of reserve to real balances outstanding under three assumptions
about initial F GP/MOur conclusion is that a central bank can lose control of the price level
during a liquidity trap episode because of timidity induced by balance
sheet worries. These balance sheet worries are justiﬁed, if there truly is no
ﬁscal backing for the bank, because of the opposite possibility, that a bank
with negative net worth and no ﬁscal backing can lose control of the price
level in an explosive inﬂation.
In our discussion of this model to this point, we have not paid any atten-
tion to ﬁscal policy. This can be justiﬁed only by assuming a passive ﬁscal
policy that keeps real debt under control regardless of the path of inﬂation.
Suppose instead, as in the scenario Loyo considers, the ﬁscal author-
ity does not make the primary surplus respond to the level of the real debt.
As an extreme case, suppose it sets the primary surplus to be constant.
Then in this, as in many previous models of this type, going back at least
to Sargent and Wallace (1981), there is no equilibrium with active mone-
tary policy ( 1/ 2   1).
Some economists believe that there is an asymmetry here, that when
these incompatible monetary and ﬁscal policies are asserted, a ﬁrmly com-
mitted monetary authority can always prevail over any attempt by the ﬁs-
cal authority to commit to an incompatible policy. But this is not true. It
cannot even be discussed coherently in a conventional macro model with a
uniﬁed budget constraint for the central bank and the treasury. If we in-
troduce separate budget constraints for the central bank and the treasury,
so that each can be imagined to possibly go bankrupt independently, we see
that there is no formal asymmetry. If anything, the asymmetry is the other
way. Central banks have died while the legislature that created them sur-
vived, but are there any examples of the reverse? And the lack of central,
rational direction of the ﬁscal policy process in democratic countries prob-
ably makes it easier, not harder, for the ﬁscal authority to commit to a pol-
icy in the face of a threat (from the CB) that it could lead to disaster.
7.4 Pros and Cons of Inﬂation Targeting
It is plausible that the CB wants to bring inﬂation or deﬂation under con-
trol, even when it has recently been having trouble doing so. This may be
less true of more artiﬁcial targets like M growth or the exchange rate. The
credibility of a commitment to inﬂation targeting may therefore be some-
what more stable. Because monetary policy can aﬀect inﬂation only with a
substantial delay, inﬂation-targeting central banks in practice produce ex-
plicit projections, generally quarterly, for a time horizon of about two years
into the future. This entails their explaining, at least to some extent, how
current policy actions are related to future objectives. This allows greater
public understanding of policy, and thereby greater credibility. The delay
means that there are generally many ways to get inﬂation into the target
range over the policy horizon. This creates room for other objectives to
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public rationale for policy choices and the actual interests of the polity.
Since there are conditions under which an inﬂation-targeting commit-
ment, as a central bank policy, has a high probability of proving unsus-
tainable, it should not be recommended in those conditions. It can easily
lead to disaster, or to an apparent initial success that magniﬁes a later dis-
aster, when the necessary ﬁscal backup to monetary policy is not available.
It would not be a good idea in Argentina today, and it may yet prove to have
been a mistake, or at least unsustainable, in Brazil. It can worsen the situ-
ation for a central bank that is at the zero bound on its policy rate and thus
has no tools to inﬂuence inﬂation. A projection for a desirable path for in-
ﬂation (or deﬂation) that cannot be backed up with an explanation of how
current central bank actions are expected to lead to the desired path will
undermine central bank credibility. Inﬂation targeting is therefore not in it-
self a policy prescription for the Bank of Japan.
7.5 How to Improve It
The main virtue of an inﬂuence-targeting regime is that it leads to in-
creased transparency as to the objectives of the central bank and as to how
the bank believes its current actions contribute to achieving those objec-
tives. These aspects of the regime ought to be pursued even where (the
United States?) the inﬂation target itself meets resistance. In fact, I would
argue that if here, in contrast to other countries, the “inﬂation-targeting”
label is a hindrance to getting the Federal Reserve Board to be more ex-
plicit about its projections of the path of the economy and about how its
actions are expected to aﬀect that path, it would be a good idea to abandon
the campaign for inﬂation targeting.
We could extend the virtues of inﬂation targeting by accompanying in-
ﬂation-report projections of inﬂation, output, and so on with projected
time paths of the policy rate. We could improve central bank models so that
they become capable of providing realistic probability bands on projec-
tions and can be invoked in explaining central bank policy choices to the
public.
It would be a good idea to make explicit the conditional nature of the
commitment to an inﬂation target. It is already well accepted that some
kinds of “shocks” can push the economy away from the inﬂation target
temporarily. When these occur, an inﬂation-targeting bank explains the
source of the shock and explains its plans to bring inﬂation back into the
target range over time. This enhances credibility, compared to taking dras-
tic policy actions to get quickly back into the target range at the cost of a
potential backlash from the political system.
Fiscal policy ought to be treated as a potential source of shocks. Ideally,
where ﬁscal policy that undermines central bank control of inﬂation is a
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ports, and reﬂected in central bank projections. Such proposals meet stiﬀ
resistance. They can be seen as threatening the current conventions of
central bank “independence,” which depend on keeping a ﬁrm distinction
between ﬁscal policy, where political considerations are considered in-
evitable, and monetary policy, which is seen as a technical matter, ideally
completely insulated from politics. (Recently Fed Staﬀ, in conversation,
cited the danger that Fed projections of ﬁscal variables would become
public as a reason to maintain the ﬁve-year secrecy rule for Fed Green Book
and model forecasts.)
Where there is little prospect of ﬁscal policy becoming a constraint on
monetary policy, or of ﬁscal policy becoming the only instrument available
for controlling the price level, detailed ﬁscal projections would not be im-
portant. But where there is such a prospect, the central bank is likely to be
the leading candidate for an institution that can analyze the policy options
for controlling inﬂation. As the designated steward of the inﬂation rate it
could make a contribution by conducting and disseminating such analysis,
even when it has reached the point where its own policy levers are not eﬀec-
tive.
7.6 Conclusion
Inﬂation targeting is in most countries an improvement in the monetary
policy regime. But the improvement comes from its being a step toward
goal and model transparency. Inﬂation targeting is a dubious recommen-
dation in precisely those economies where advice from economists about
controlling inﬂation is most needed. If we separate the transparency as-
pects of inﬂation targeting from its nominal-anchor-nostrum aspect, we
may come up with a more widely applicable policy recommendation. The
central bank should probably everywhere be charged with making projec-
tions of inﬂation, laying out policy actions that could stabilize inﬂation,
and either taking those actions or explaining why it cannot and who could.
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Comment Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé
When I was invited to discuss Christopher Sims’s contribution to the In-
ﬂation Targeting Conference, one of the reasons I looked very much for-
ward to preparing the discussion—besides the fact that a Sims paper is typ-
ically a very rewarding read—was that I hoped to ﬁnally learn what exactly
inﬂation targeting is and what exactly an inﬂation-targeting central bank is
supposed to do. However, I soon realized that this would not happen. I
have come to the conclusion that inﬂation targeting is a nebulous monetary
policy prescription. This concept is not as clearly deﬁned as I had hoped
for, and it certainly cannot easily be tied to very precise instructions for the
central bank on how to behave. Chris Sims, though, I should note, is more
willing to come forward with a deﬁnition of inﬂation targeting than others
who write on the topic. His deﬁnition of inﬂation targeting is “simply any
commitment by the central bank to control the time path of the inﬂation
rate or the price level, at least in the long run.” In my opinion, this deﬁni-
tion could be one of any monetary policy rather than that of inﬂation tar-
geting in particular. This is because undoubtedly, any central bank strives
to control the time path of inﬂation or the price level. With this in mind,
one can then interpret the limits of inﬂation targeting that are presented in
the Sims paper as limits that any monetary policymaker, and not just an in-
ﬂation targeter, will face. Thus, the concerns raised in the Sims paper will
apply very generally, making them only the more relevant.
The Sims paper analyzes two economies in which there are limits to in-
ﬂation targeting. In one case inﬂation targeting may open the door to un-
intended deﬂation, and in the other case inﬂation targeting may open the
door to a speculative inﬂation. The logical next question the paper asks is
how those speculative in- and deﬂations can be avoided. Contrary to the
existing related literature, the Sims analysis treats the central bank and the
ﬁscal authority as independent entities, each with its own budget con-
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I would like to thank Martín Uribe for comments.straint. The main contribution of the paper is to show that a central bank
that lacks ﬁscal backing from the treasury may be more limited in its abil-
ity to achieve its goals regarding inﬂation than a central bank that enjoys
the full ﬁnancial support of the ﬁscal authority.
The Sims paper eﬀectively communicates through insightful discussions
that central bank independence may interfere with a central bank’s ability
to ﬁght oﬀ self-fulﬁlling in- and deﬂations. The most formal presentation
of this idea is given for an economy that tries to control inﬂation through
an inertial interest rate feedback rule (see section 7.3). First, in this section
it is shown that, contrary to the intentions of the central bank, the interest
rate feedback rule may allow for speculative inﬂations. Then the paper
shows that the usual remedy against speculative inﬂations, namely frac-
tional reserve backing, may not work if the central bank does not have ac-
cess to revenues created by the taxing power of the ﬁscal authority.
In what follows, I present a short review of the existing literature on lim-
its to price-level or inﬂation control and on how to rule out speculative in-
and deﬂations. I then ask whether those strategies will also work under the
assumption of central bank independence. I show that for the economy
studied in greatest detail in the Sims paper, the one of section 7.3, it is pos-
sible to rule out speculative inﬂations despite the fact that the central bank
is independent. What is needed, should the economy embark on a specu-
lative inﬂation, is a commitment by the central bank to switch to a mone-
tary policy that ﬁrst builds central bank net worth and then pegs the price
level.
Can the Central Bank Alone Control the Path of Inﬂation?
Given ﬁscal policy, one can in general distinguish three cases. In the ﬁrst
case, the inﬂation path targeted by the central bank is necessarily unsus-
tainable under all conceivable ways of conducting monetary policy; that is,
it creates too little seigniorage revenue to make ﬁscal policy sustainable. In
the second case, the inﬂation path targeted by the central bank can in prin-
ciple be supported as an equilibrium outcome. But some monetary policies
will imply that the inﬂation path is not attained and instead the economy
must converge either to a self-fulﬁlling inﬂation or to a self-fulﬁlling deﬂa-
tion with probability one. For example, Loyo (1999) argues that the com-
bination of an active interest rate feedback rule and a non-Ricardian ﬁscal
policy led Brazil to hyperinﬂation in the mid-1980s. In the third scenario,
it could also be the case that some monetary policies will imply that the tar-
geted inﬂation path is only one of several price paths that are consistent
with the monetary ﬁscal regime. Here again there are two cases. Besides the
target rate of inﬂation, equilibria exist with self-fulﬁlling inﬂations and de-
ﬂations. For examples see the work of Brock (1974, 1975), Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ(1983), Woodford (1994, 2003), and Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and
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ﬂation there exist other bounded equilibria. Those can be of two types. One
type is perfect-foresight equilibria converging to the steady state. Typically,
not just a single one of those exists, but a continuum. To name but a few,
examples are contained in the work of Woodford (1994); Leeper (1991);
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000); and Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and
Uribe (2001a). Another class of bounded equilibria that may exist is equi-
libria converging to a cycle, as shown in Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and
Uribe (2001a, b, 2003), or chaotic equilibria (Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé,
and Uribe, 2002b). Finally, it could be the case that the monetary policy
will imply that the targeted path of inﬂation is the only equilibrium out-
come. This scenario is the one that is desired, but as the above discussion
demonstrates, this will not always be the case.
What Monetary Strategies Have Been Proposed to 
Rule Out Speculative Inﬂations or Deﬂations?
In the existing literature two strategies have been proposed to rule out
self-fulﬁlling inﬂations. One strategy is to impose restrictions on prefer-
ences that imply that money is essential in the sense that utility would con-
verge to negative inﬁnity when real balances approach zero. This route has
been studied (and criticized as economically unreasonable) in Brock (1974,
1975), Gray (1984), and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1983). The model analyzed
in the Sims paper does not make this assumption. Rather, it makes the
more plausible assumption that once liquidity becomes too expensive
agents are willing to regress to barter and not use money at all. The second
strategy, which is typically regarded as more compelling, for it does not rely
on questionable assumptions about the nature of preferences, is to switch
to a price-level peg (see Wallace [1981] and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [1983]). It
is the eﬀectiveness of this second strategy that the Sims paper studies in de-
tail in the case that the central bank lacks ﬁnancial backing from the ﬁscal
authority.
Similarly, the existing literature contains routes on how to rule out self-
fulﬁlling deﬂations relying on preference speciﬁcations and on monetary
policy switches. One possible route is the adoption of a price-level peg. For
this strategy to work, the central bank must be willing to purchase, for ex-
ample, foreign exchange at a ﬁxed price with money. Svensson (2001) has
labeled this strategy of avoiding unintended deﬂations the “foolproof way”
and has recommended it as a promising strategy for Japan to escape its de-
ﬂationary trap. An alternative route to escaping the liquidity trap has been
proposed by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2002a). They show that
the switch to a positive money growth rate peg, if accompanied by the right
ﬁscal policy, will prevent an economy from falling into a deﬂationary
spiral.
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the Central Bank Is Independent of the Fiscal Authority?
The Svensson (2001) foolproof way of avoiding a self-fulﬁlling liquidity
trap requires that the central bank stand ready to buy (in principle, unlim-
ited quantities of) assets in exchange for currency. From a balance sheet
point of view, this strategy should provide few problems. It requires the
central bank to buy ﬁnancial assets with money. Since the central bank has
access to unlimited amounts of money, this strategy is clearly feasible even
in the absence of resource transfers from the ﬁscal authority. In the Sims
paper, it is argued that this strategy may not be adopted because the cen-
tral bank does not want to make its balance sheet longer. The reason given
why a central bank may object to making its balance sheet longer is that it
would make it more prone to variations in net worth stemming from vari-
ations in the real value of central bank assets. The Sims paper cites in par-
ticular the exchange rate risk associated with purchases of foreign cur-
rency–denominated bonds.
However, if the foolproof way of avoiding speculative deﬂations is eﬀec-
tive, it means that prices will never start falling to begin with and the central
bank will never have to actually implement the price-level peg. In this case
the balance sheet considerations should play no role. Second, suppose an
economy is already in a liquidity trap and contemplates the implementation
of a price-level peg to prevent further declines in prices. In the self-fulﬁlling
deﬂation, prices and nominal balances are declining at about the same rate
(ignoring growth for the moment). But if a price-level peg is implemented,
then real balances should fall (because inﬂation will increase from a nega-
tive quantity to zero), and with the price level pegged this means that nom-
inal money balances must fall, leading to outﬂows of central bank reserves
rather than inﬂows. That is, the balance sheet of the central bank will be-
come shorter and not longer. (This is the famous balance-of-payments cri-
sis argument.) The central bank may even set the price-level peg at exactly
that level that will imply that nominal money balances are unchanged. To
be able to achieve this, it will have to announce that the price level is pegged
at a higher level than the price level in place immediately before the switch
to the price-level peg. In this case, central bank independence will again not
stand in the way of the quest for price stability.
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2002a) show that the central bank
can rule out self-fulﬁlling deﬂations by switching policy to a (positive)
money growth rate peg. As will become clear from the discussion in the
next section, this strategy can be successful even if the net worth of the cen-
tral bank is initially negative and the central bank is independent.
The central argument in the Sims paper is that a price-level peg may not
rule out self-fulﬁlling inﬂations under central bank independence. Specif-
ically, it is argued that a self-fulﬁlling inﬂation may not be averted if the
central bank has negative net worth. However, this result hinges critically
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where it is assumed that the central bank follows an inertial interest rate
feedback rule. In the example studied in section 7.3 of the Sims paper, when
the economy demonetizes—that is, when real balances converge to zero—
nominal balances are actually declining. So it is a case of a self-fulﬁlling in-
ﬂation with shrinking nominal balances. In most existing historical ex-
amples of economies in which accelerating inﬂation led to demonetization
of the economy, the opposite was observed. The accelerating inﬂation oc-
curs in an environment in which nominal money balances are increasing,
albeit at a slower rate than prices.
This feature of the Sims analysis is important. For only if M ˙   0 is net
worth of the central bank shrinking along the hyperinﬂationary path. To see
this, let w(t)d e note the ratio of central bank assets to central bank liabili-
ties—that is, in the notation of the Sims paper w(t)   P(t)F G(t)/M(t). It fol-
lows that w ˙/w    F ˙
G/F G – M ˙ /M. Using the central bank’s budget con-
straint, equation (22) in the Sims paper, and assuming that the central bank
makes no transfers to the ﬁscal authority,  B 0, it follows that w ˙/w (  
 )   M ˙ /M(1/w – 1). Suppose that initially the central bank’s net worth is
negative, so that 0   w   1. Then, in a self-fulﬁlling inﬂation, the balance
sheet of the central bank is deteriorating only if nominal money balances
are falling.1 This seems to suggest that in cases in which in a self-fulﬁlling
hyperinﬂation nominal money balances are increasing central bank inde-
pendence may not be an obstacle to ruling out self-fulﬁlling hyperinﬂations.
In the section that follows, I present an example of a self-fulﬁlling hy-
perinﬂation in which along the hyperinﬂationary path nominal money
balances are increasing and argue that in this case one can rule out those
inﬂationary paths through fractional reserve backing even in the case that
the central bank is independent. The reason is that if nominal money bal-
ances are increasing on the way to a speculative inﬂation, the central bank
accumulates real resources. At some point it must then be the case that the
net worth of the central bank becomes nonnegative. That is, we must have
that at some point PFG/M   1. At that exact instance, the central bank
could switch to a pure price-level peg. This price-level peg will be sustain-
able because the central bank could, if need be, redeem the entire stock of
money for reserves.
An Example of Ruling Out Speculative Inﬂations 
under Central Bank Independence
The Household
The household’s problem is almost the same as the one described in sec-
tion 7.3 of the Sims paper. The main diﬀerence is that it is assumed that
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1. Note that    denotes the nominal interest rate, which in equilibrium must be non-
negative.time is discrete, whereas in the Sims paper time is continuous. Without loss
of generality, one can assume that households can only hold two types of
asset—money and foreign bonds—rather than three, as is assumed in the
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The household takes P t,  t, yt, and  t as exogenously given. The initial con-
ditions of the household are M–1 and (1    –1)FP
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The Fiscal Authority
We assume that the ﬁscal authority does not issue bonds and simply re-
bates any seigniorage income it receives from the central bank to private
households—that is,
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2. The notation follows that of the Sims paper.(7)  t    t
B.
This assumption about the nature of ﬁscal policy is consistent with the
treatment of ﬁscal policy in the Sims paper. The Sims paper, however, is less
speciﬁc and simply states that “a passive ﬁscal policy keeps real debt under
control regardless of the path of inﬂation.”3
The Monetary Authority
At the end of period t, the central bank has real assets in the amount of Ft
G.
Following the Sims paper, I assume that its period-by-period budget con-
straint is given by
(8) Ft
G   (1    t 1)FG
t 1   
Mt  
P t
Mt 1      t
B.
Central bank independence is interpreted in the Sims paper to mean that
 t
B must be nonnegative; that is, the central bank cannot get backing for its
liabilities in the form of transfers from the ﬁscal authority.4 For simplicity,
I will assume further that
(9)  t
B   0.
Equilibrium
A perfect-foresight equilibrium is a set of sequences {ct,  t, Mt, P t, Ft
G,
Ft
P,  t,  t,  t
B} given exogenous {yt,  t} and the initial values of M–1, (1  
 –1)F–1
G, and (1    –1)FP
–1 satisfying equations (1)–(9), with equation (3)
holding with equality, and one additional equation describing monetary
policy.
To characterize the equilibrium dynamics, use equation (4) to eliminate
 t from equation (5) to obtain
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3. Central bank independence and non-Ricardian ﬁscal policy can give rise to default by
the ﬁscal authority. See Uribe (2002) for a characterization of the equilibrium behavior of de-
fault under central bank independence and alternative non-Ricardian policy regimes.
4. A slightly diﬀerent interpretation of central bank independence is that the central bank
chooses  t
B subject to the constraint that it has to be nonnegative. For if the ﬁscal authority
could determine the magnitude of  t
B, then the ﬁscal authority would eﬀectively gain control
over net worth of the central bank and could, for example, ﬁnance ﬁscal deﬁcits with reserves.
For the arguments that follow, it is important that the central bank, and not the ﬁscal au-
thority, control the size of  t
B. Consider now the case that the central bank follows a money growth rate
peg by setting M(0) and then letting Mt evolve according to the rule
(11) Mt 1    Mt;   1,
where   denotes the gross growth rate of the money supply. For this mon-
etary policy speciﬁcation, equation (10) is a ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation
in one endogenous variable,  t. The steady state of that equation solves
1    ∗2  ( ∗)       1,
where  ∗ denotes the steady-state value of consumption velocity. For the
particular functional form of  ( ) assumed in the Sims paper—that is,  ( )
     /(1      )—we have
 ∗   .
The existence of a steady state in which velocity is positive requires that
 / 2 1 –   –1. One can show that if a steady state exists, it is unique. Next
I wish to show that for any  (0)    ∗, equation (10) implies that as long as
the money growth rate peg is in place  t 1   t. To see this, rewrite equation
(10) as
[1    ( t 1)    t 1  ( t 1)] t 1   
 [1   
 
t
2  ( t)]
 [1    ( t)    t  ( t)] t.
Let G( t)  [1   ( t)    t  ( t)] tand F( t)   /{ [1 –  t
2  ( t)]}[1   ( t)  
 t  ( t)] t. Note that both G( ) and F( ) are increasing in  . Clearly, at   
 ∗, G( )   F( ). However, for     ∗, F( )   G( ) because  /( [1– t
2  { t}]
  1. Thus, in order for  t to satisfy equilibrium condition (10) in the case
that  0    ∗, it must be the case that  t is increasing over time. If this explo-
sive path for v can be supported as an equilibrium outcome, then specula-
tive inﬂations are possible in this economy. For simplicity, we assume that
 (1    t)   1 for all t. It follows from equation (4) that  t    0 for all t   0.
By equation (4) the time path for consumption is then given by ct   1/ 0/
(1    [ t]    t  [ t]) for all t. From this relation and the deﬁnition of veloc-
ity it follows that P 0    0M0 0(1    [ 0]    0  [ 0]). Iterating equation (1)
forward and using equation (1) one obtains a present discounted value 
constraint of the form Σ 
t 0 qt(yt    t – [1   ( t)]ct – Mt/P t[Rt 1 – 1]/Rt 1)  
M–1/P 0   (1    )FP
–1   0, where qt   Πt–1
s 0(1  s)–1 and Rt 1   (1    t)P t 1/P t  
1/(1 –  t
2  [ t]). Using the deﬁnition of velocity to eliminate Mt/P t and 
equation (4), we can rearrange this expression to get Σ 
t 0 qt(yt    t – [1  
 { t}]/[1   { t}    t  { t}]/ 0– 1/[1   { t}    t  { t}]/ 0/ t[Rt 1– 1]/Rt 1)
  M–1/ 0/M0/(1    [ 0]    0  [ 0]/y0   (1    )FP
–1.   0. Given a time path
for vt, this expression uniquely determines  0. Finally, note that because
nominal money balances are not shrinking (  1) over time, central bank
net wealth is increasing; that is, P t 1 FG
t 1/Mt 1   P tFt
G/Mt.
 1        1  
   
         1        1  
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be supported as an equilibrium outcome. The consequence of this result is
that the central bank would not have control over inﬂation. This is because
any  0    ∗ constitutes a perfect-foresight equilibrium. The existence of
self-fulﬁlling inﬂations in economies in which monetary policy takes the
form of a money growth rate peg is a well-known result; see, for example,
Brock (1974, 1975), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1983), and Woodford (1994).
Equally well known are ways to rule such speculative inﬂations out. In par-
ticular, Wallace (1981) and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀhave suggested using frac-
tional backing as a way to rule out speculative inﬂations. Under a policy of
fractional backing the central bank commits to adopt a price-level target
at some price level P  should the price level pass a certain threshold. For this
threat to be credible it must be the case that, at the moment the price-level
target is implemented, the central bank has suﬃcient reserves on hand to
exchange the entire money stock in circulation at the preannounced price;
that is, we need that P  FG
t–1   Mt–1, where t is the ﬁrst period in which the
price-level peg is in place. In standard analysis the ﬁscal and monetary au-
thority are treated as a unit with a single consolidated budget constraint.
In this case, the solvency requirement of the central bank is of no concern,
for the central bank is implicitly guaranteed support from the ﬁscal au-
thority (in the form of tax revenue) to redeem money for real assets should
there be a need.
Our concern here is how we can rule a self-fulﬁlling inﬂation in this
model even if the central bank is independent. Suppose that the central
bank announces that it will follow a money growth rate peg with   1 and
that should  0    ∗, then the money growth rate peg would only stay in
place until P tFt
G   Mt. Let T denote the ﬁrst period in which P tFt
G   Mt;
then the central bank will keep the money growth rate peg until period T,
and from period T   1 on, it will follow a price-level peg of the form P t  
P T for all t   T. Then we know from equation (5) that 1 –  2
T  ( T)    ,
which implies that  T  ∗. At the same time, with  0  ∗equilibrium con-
dition (31) can only be satisﬁed if  T   T–1    T–2 ...      0  ∗.But both
of those conditions can never be satisﬁed at the same time. Therefore,  0  
 ∗ cannot be supported as a perfect-foresight equilibrium. It follows that
fractional backing is capable of ruling out a self-fulﬁlling inﬂation even in
the case in which the central bank starts out with negative net worth and
never receives an injection of resources from the ﬁscal authority.
Finally, suppose that a central bank wishes to follow an interest rate
feedback rule like the one studied in the Sims paper. One possible strategy
to rule out self-fulﬁlling inﬂations in this case is to commit to switching to
a money growth rate peg should central bank net worth fall too low, and in
addition threaten to switch monetary policy yet again to a price-level tar-
get once the net worth of the central bank is suﬃciently large.
The reason why fractional reserve backing does not work in the econ-
Limits to Inﬂation Targeting 307omy presented in section 7.3 of the Sims paper is that under the interest rate
policy, net worth of the central bank may be falling along the self-fulﬁlling
hyperinﬂation (see ﬁgure 7.2 of the Sims paper). Speciﬁcally, the analysis
of the Sims paper shows that if a central bank starts with suﬃciently nega-
tive net worth, it will never be able to reach solvency when the economy
falls into a speculative inﬂation, and hence the central bank will never be
able to announce a credible price-level peg. However, under a positive
money growth rate peg, even under a self-fulﬁlling inﬂation, nominal
money balances increase over time, and therefore the net worth of the cen-
tral bank, P tFt
G/Mt, improves with time.
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308 Christopher A. SimsDiscussion Summary
Frederic Mishkin suggested that risks to ﬁnancial stability imposed as im-
portant limits on monetary policy as did ﬁscal stability. In recent work with
Guillermo Calvo, the authors argued that in emerging economies problems
related to ﬁnancial and ﬁscal policies were of a larger order of magnitude
compared to problems related to monetary policy. Another example was
the recent experience of Brazil, where depreciation in response to political
uncertainty forced the inﬂation target to be raised. He agreed with Sims on
the important role that the central bank’s balance sheet had to play, and
pointed out that the Bank of Japan had explained in this regard its reluc-
tance to pursue more expansionary monetary policies.
Masaaki Shirakawa pointed out that in the current situation in Japan,
with nominal interest rates even at long maturities near zero, the distinc-
tion between bonds and money becomes blurred, meaning that distinction
between monetary policy and ﬁscal policy is also becoming blurred. At the
moment, the amount of Japan government bonds held by the Bank of
Japan was about 60 percent of the monetary base, which according to con-
ventional measures could raise questions about the soundness of the Bank
of Japan’s balance sheet. The Bank of Japan had already engaged in sub-
stantial quantitative easing, expanding the size of its balance sheet from 15
percent of GDP four years ago to about 26 percent now. A related question
was whether the Bank of Japan should take on diﬀerent forms of risk by
purchasing assets other than JGBs. For the Bank of Japan to engage in
some form of ﬁscal policy, it would probably need some kind of commit-
ment from the government to guarantee its solvency, if the general public
questioned the ability of a central bank whose capital position is impaired
to pursue adequate monetary policy.
Bennett McCallum questioned the view that transparency was the main
advantage of inﬂation targeting, and argued that from the mid-1970s until
the start of EMU the Bundesbank had been both the most successful cen-
tral bank in terms of inﬂation control and one of the least transparent.
Christopher Sims responded that central banks usually faced legal re-
strictions on trading money for real assets, which pointed to the need for
monetary-ﬁscal coordination in preventing deﬂationary spirals. This
pointed to further need to rethink the boundaries between ﬁscal and mon-
etary policy, and the proper role of central bank independence.
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